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Abstract
This paper examines the quantitative eﬀects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and
workforce participation. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous
agents in entrepreneurial ability. Gender gaps in entrepreneurship aﬀect negatively both
income and aggregate productivity, since they reduce the entrepreneurs' average talent.
Speciﬁcally, the expected income loss from excluding 5% of women is 2.5%, while the
loss is 10% if they are all employers. We ﬁnd that gender gaps cause an average income
loss of 15% in the OECD, 40% of which is due to entrepreneurship gaps. Extending
the model to developing countries, we obtain substantially higher losses, with signiﬁcant
variation across regions.
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1 Introduction
Although recent decades have witnessed a signiﬁcant drop in gender gaps in many coun-
tries, the prevalence of gender inequality is still high, especially in the developing world. These
gaps are apparent in several dimensions, including education, political representation, and bar-
gaining inside the household. In the labor market, women typically receive lower wages, are
underrepresented in most occupations, work fewer hours than men and have less access to
productive inputs.1
One important aspect of gender inequality in the labor market that has not been much
studied in the literature is the low presence of women in entrepreneurial activities. The
World Bank (2001) estimates that, in developed countries, the average incidence of females
among employers is less than 30%. According to OECD (2014), across the 27 European
Union countries, only 25% of business owners with employees are women, only 3% of CEOs
are women, and the percentage of females in boards is only 18%.2 In OECD countries, the
proportion of sole-proprietors enterprises owned by women is between 20% and 40%. Studies
looking at developing countries ﬁnd much larger gender gaps. Macchiavello et al. (2014),
for example, analyze the garment industry in Bangladesh and ﬁnd that four of every ﬁve
production workers in this industry are women, while just over one in 20 supervisors is a
woman. In their experiment, they show that, after receiving adequate training, women are
as likely as men to keep their job but less likely to be tried out or promoted. Everything
else equal, a better use of women's potential in the labor market is likely to result in greater
macroeconomic eﬃciency. When there are no friction to agents' labor choices, for example,
the most talented people typically organize production carried out by others and, as a result,
they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. From this point of view, obstacles
to women's access to entrepreneurship reduce the average ability of a country's entrepreneurs,
aﬀecting negatively the way production is organized in the economy and, hence, reducing its
market output.3
The objective of this article is to examine the quantitative eﬀects of gender gaps in en-
trepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita.
We ﬁrst develop an occupational choice model that illustrates the negative impact of gen-
der inequality on resource allocation and, as a result, on aggregate productivity and income
1See, for instance, Klasen and Lamanna (2009), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008, 2014), and Blau and Kahn
(2007, 2013).
2A report by Cranﬁeld University (2014) states that the United Kingdom has made more progress in
reducing these gaps than other EU countries: in 2014, 20% of all directors of UK companies in the FTSE 100
were females, up from 12.5% in 2010. The proportion of executive directors in these companies was 7% up
from 5.5% in 2010.
3Elborgh-Waytek et al. (2013) also argue that gender inequality may have negative macroeconomic eﬀects.
Barsh and Yee (2012) claim that the employment of women on an equal basis would allow companies to make
a better use of talent.
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per capita. Our theoretical framework is an extension of the span-of-control model of Lucas
(1978). We add two new elements to his model. First, we consider a third occupation, namely
self-employment, on top of employers and workers, as in Gollin (2008). Secondly, we introduce
several exogenous frictions that only aﬀect women. In the model, agents are endowed with
entrepreneurial talent drawn from a random distribution and choose their occupation based
on this talent. While men are unrestricted in their labor market choices, women's choices
are limited, which leads of an ineﬃcient allocation of talent across occupations and reduces
aggregate productivity as well as income per capita.
Quantitatively, the model predicts that if all women were excluded from entrepreneurship,
income per capita would fall by 10% in the short run, due to the fall in the average talent of
entrepreneurs. In the long run, when the capital stock is adjusted to the new productivity
level, income per capita would fall by 11%. If all women were excluded from the labor force,
on the other hand, output per capita would fall by almost 47% in the short run, when the
capital stock is ﬁxed, and by 50% in the long run, when capital per worker is readjusted. It
is worth noting that in the model we abstract from the decision to participate in the labor
market, i.e. we assume that all agents work in some occupation unless they are not allowed
to do so. Henceforth, our exercise only calculates market output losses, since in reality women
not participating in the labor market are likely to generate some production in the household
sector. We omit household production in the model to keep the analysis as simple as possible,
but also because of the lack of data.4
In the cross-country analysis, we use the model to quantify the eﬀects of the existing
labor market gender gaps in a large sample of both developed and developing economies.
The benchmark model prediction for the sample of OECD countries is an average income
loss of 15% due to entrepreneurship and participation gender gaps, almost 40% of which is
due to due to gender gaps in entrepreneurship. The model is then extended to incorporate
out-of-necessity entrepreneurs, i.e. agents who choose self-employment as their occupation
because they have no better job choices. We use this extended version of the model to
quantify the eﬀects of the gender gaps in a sample of developing countries, for which it has
been documented that self-employment (and out-of-necessity self-employment) is much more
prevalent than in rich countries.5 The model with out-of-necessity self-employed predicts
larger average income losses for the sample of developing countries, with signiﬁcant variation
across geographical regions. In the Middle East and North Africa, theaverage income loss due
to gender gaps is almost 38%, about a ﬁfth of which is due to the occupational gender gaps,
while in Central Asia the average income loss is about 10%, with 70% of the loss generated
4In what follows we will refer to restrictions to women in the labor market, although, once again, we do
not know with certainty to what extent these restrictions reﬂect women's optimal choices.
5See the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey (Brush et al. (2011), www.gemconsortium.org, and
Poschke (2013) for a detailed characterization of this type of entrepreneurs.
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by the occupational gender gaps. Merging the two samples, we ﬁnd that there is an inverse-U
relationship between the level of development of a country and its income losses caused by all
the gender gaps entrepreneurship and labor force participation, while there is a negative
relationship between the development level and the income losses caused only by gender gaps
in entrepreneurship. These results are consistent with the observed U-shaped relationship
between development and female labor force participation.6
The origins of these labor market frictions could be very diverse and, in this paper, we do
not aim at identifying whether they are due to pure discrimination or they reﬂect women's
optimal choices taking into account their alternatives. In 2010, the OECD launched its Gender
Initiative to analyze speciﬁc barriers that women face in the labor market, as well as to
implement policies that promote gender equality in OECD countries and beyond (OECD
2012, 2014).7 The barriers identiﬁed in their study can broadly be classiﬁed in diﬀerent
categories. First, women are often less likely than men to borrow money in order to ﬁnance a
business (Eurostat, 2008).8 Second, informational or cultural factors may also create barriers
for women who wish to become entrepreneurs. For example, shareholders are less likely to
appoint women as managers due to lack of data on women's performance as entrepreneurs.
Similarly, young women and women out of the labor force often lack accurate information
about entrepreneurship as a viable and attractive career for them. Third, women's preferences
for part-time work and a better work-like balance, in combination with an inﬂexible labor
market, lead women to run smaller ﬁrms and earn less than their male counterparts, which
could partly explain why the labor force participation of women is below that of men in most
countries.9 Fourth, women often seem to lack the necessary conﬁdence in their skills to become
entrepreneurs.10 Moreover, as a result of all the previous barriers, women tend to have less
experience than men when they start up a business, which may explain their lower earnings
as entrepreneurs. One additional natural reason why women may be underrepresented in the
labor market is the existence of gender gaps in education for young women. In recent decades,
however, education gender gaps have substantially shrinked in most countries, as shown in
Becker et al. (2010), which documents an unprecedented increase in higher education in the
last 40 years all over the world, especially for women. Their study shows that, nowadays,
6See, for instance, Goldin (1995).
7See also www.oecd.org/gender/data.
8According to Cole and Mehran (2009), women in the United States are more likely to be discouraged to
apply for loans for fear of rejection, although there is some evidence showing that, once they do so, they do
not have a higher rejection rate than their men counterpart.
9A related issue is that, in many countries, government policies tend to focus on helping start-ups and
small ﬁrms. While this may indeed help women to run their own ﬁrms, it makes them less likely to create
relatively large ﬁrms.
10Coleman and Robb (2012) claim that this may in part be explained by women's lack of familiarity with
ﬁnance and accounting practices.
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in most high-income countries and in many lower-income ones, there are indeed more women
than men that complete tertiary education. Parro (2012) examines the evolution of the gender
gap in education in a large sample of developed and developing countries between 1950 and
2005. He ﬁnds that gender inequality in education increased between 1950 and 1975 and
decreased between 1975 and 2005. Using long-run data (1800-2010), Morrison and Murtin
(2009) construct a new database on historical educational attainment with a sample of 74
countries for the period 1870-2010 and concludes that educational attainment accelerated
in the second half of the twentieth century and that there has been some convergence in
educational attainment in a sample of developed countries. In terms of gender, they ﬁnd that
in most Asian and African countries, the educational takeoﬀ has closed the gender gap. Only
sub-Saharan Africa and India currently lag behind other countries in terms of gender gaps
between female and male education. In view of our analysis, one would expect that these
improvements should have translated into less gender gaps in the labor market.11
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy discuss the
existing literature linking labor gender inequality and economic growth, with an emphasis on
papers most closely related to our work. The benchmark theoretical model is presented in
Section 3. The numerical simulations and the cross-country results for the OECD sample are
described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the extended model for the developing countries
and shows the simulation results for the non-OECD sample. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The empirical literature on the relationship between economic growth and gender inequal-
ity is quite extensive.12 This literature has reached some consensus on the fact that there is
a positive eﬀect of increases in income per capita on gender equality and, more relevant to
our paper, a negative eﬀect of gender inequality on economic growth. Some studies show a
negative eﬀect of gaps in the labor force participation on a country's economic performance
(Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; Thévenon et al., 2012, ILO, 2014). More commonly, though,
gender gaps in education have been emphasized as a growth deterrent (Barro and Lee, 1993;
Tzannatos, 1999; Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Klasen, 2002; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Abu-
Ghaida and Klasen, 2004; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; Thévenon et al., 2012). These gaps
may have a direct eﬀect on growth but they also operate through the labor market channels
11In spite of the fact that gender diﬀerences in education have narrowed substantially in recent decades, girls
are still often subject to education biases that make them less inclined to study ﬁelds in which individuals are
more likely to eventually become entrepreneurs. The OECD (2013), for instance, reports that women have a
higher probability to obtain degrees in health and humanities, but they are underrepresented in the so-called
STEM ﬁelds of study (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics).
12 See, for instance, Goldin (1990), Dollar and Gatti (1999), Tzannatos (1999), or Klasen (2002). Cuberes
and Teignier (2014) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on this topic.
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that we study in this paper. In particular, as explained above, less educated women, or biases
in women's education, can lead to lower female labor force participation and women being
underrepresented in entrepreneurship.
In the theoretical literature, several studies focus on explaining the eﬀects of economic
growth on diﬀerent gender gaps, for example, Becker and Lewis (1973), Galor and Weil
(1996), Greenwood et al. (2005), Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Fernandez (2009) and Ngai
and Petrongolo (2013). Other papers have focused on the reverse eﬀect, i.e. the impact of
gender inequality on growth. These theories are, in most cases, based on the fertility and
children's human capital channels, as in Galor and Weil (1996), and Lagerlöf (2003).13 Galor
and Weil (1996), for example, argue that an increase in women's relative wage increases the
cost of raising children, which lowers population growth, increases children's education levels
and leads to higher labor productivity and growth. Our paper diﬀerentiates from these the-
oretical articles in two directions: ﬁrst, we calibrate and simulate our theoretical framework
in order to be able to produce reasonable estimates of the costs associated to speciﬁc gender
gaps. Second, we focus on a relatively ignored mechanism through which gender inequality
reduces aggregate productivity, namely, the talent pool channel.
With respect to the ﬁrst point, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) construct a growth model
based on Galor and Weil (1996) in which there is exogenous wage discrimination against
women. When they calibrate their model using U.S. data, they ﬁnd very large eﬀects asso-
ciated with these wage gaps: a 50 percent increase in the gender wage gap in their model
leads to a decrease in income per capita of a quarter of the original output. Their results also
suggest that a large fraction of the actual diﬀerence in output per capita between the U.S.
and other countries is indeed generated by the presence of gender inequality in wages. We
depart from this paper in that our focus is on the misallocation of talent and resources caused
by gender inequality.
With respect to the second point, Esteve-Volart (2009) also develops a model of occupa-
tional choice and talent heterogeneity. Her paper ﬁnds that labor market discrimination leads
to lower average entrepreneurial talent and slower female human capital accumulation which,
in turn, has a negative impact on technology adoption, innovation and economic growth. The
model, however, is used to derive qualitative results but not to carry out numerical exercises.
To our knowledge, the only existing paper that incorporates a quantitative analysis and
considers the talent pool channel is Hsieh et al. (2013). Their paper uses a Roy model to
estimate the eﬀect of the changing occupational allocation of white women, black men, and
black women between 1960 and 2008 on U.S. economic growth and ﬁnds that the improved
allocation of talent during this period accounts for 17 to 20 percent of growth. Our paper
13Lagerlöf (2006) calibrates the Galor-Weil model but does not provide a quantitative estimate of the
productivity costs associated with a decrease in gender inequality.
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diﬀers from theirs in several dimensions. First, we explicitly add self-employment as a possible
occupation in the model, which is particularly important to model the behavior of developing
countries. Second, we study the eﬀects of gender inequality in the labor market in a large
sample of countries, rather than just focusing in the U.S economy. Finally, our theoretical
framework is substantially diﬀerent from theirs in that we emphasize, although, in a static
framework, the span-of-control element of agents who run ﬁrms.14
3 Benchmark model
In this section, we present a general equilibrium occupational choice model where agents are
endowed with a random entrepreneurship skill that determines their optimal occupation. The
model is based on the span-of-control framework in Lucas (1978), with the extension of self-
employment as a possible occupational choice. In the benchmark model, agents choose to
work as either employers, self-employed, or workers, while in the extended model presented in
Section 5 we introduce the possibility of having the so-called out-of-necessity self-employed,
in line with the literature claiming that in developing countries self-employment is the only
possible alternative for some agents.
3.1 Model setup
The economy we consider has a continuum of agents indexed by their entrepreneurial talent
x, drawn from a cumulative distribution Γ that takes values between B and ∞. We assume
the economy is closed and that it has a workforce of size N and K units of capital. Labor
and capital are inelastically supplied in the market by consumers, in exchange for a wage
rate w and a capital rental rate r respectively. These inputs are then combined by ﬁrms
to produce an homogeneous good. Agents decide to become either ﬁrm workers, who earn
the equilibrium wage rate w which we assume to be independent of their entrepreneurial
talent, or entrepreneurs, who earn the proﬁts generated by the ﬁrm they manage.15
An agent with entrepreneurial talent or productivity level x who chooses to become an
employer and hires n(x) units of labor and k(x) units of capital produces y(x) units of output
and earns proﬁts pi (x) = y (x)− rk (x)−wn (x), where the price of the homogeneous good is
14Our paper also relates to several recent papers that use the span-of-control model of Lucas (1978) to
study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions and other cross-country diﬀerences on the misallocation of resources and
productivity. See, for example, Amaral and Quintin (2010), Antunes et al. (2008), Bhattacharya et al. (2013),
Buera et al. (2011), Buera and Shin (2013) and Erosa et al. (2010).
15In what follows we will refer to an entrepreneur as someone who works as either an employer or a self-
employed.
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normalized to one. As in Lucas (1978) and Buera and Shin (2011), the production function
is given by
y (x) = x
(
k(x)αn(x)1−α
)η
, (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1). The parameter η measures the span of control of entrepreneurs
and, since it is smaller than one, the entrepreneurial technology involves an element of dimin-
ishing returns. On the other hand, an agent with talent x who chooses to become self-
employed uses the amount of capital k˜ (x), produces y˜ (x) units of output and earns proﬁts
p˜i (x) = y˜ (x)− rk˜ (x). The technology he or she operates is
y˜ (x) = τxk˜(x)αη, (2)
where τ is the self-employed productivity parameter.16 One interpretation of this parameter
is that self-employed workers have to spend a fraction of their time on management tasks,
which would imply that τ is equal to the fraction of time available for work to the power
(1− α) η. As explained below, we estimate this parameter to match the average fraction of
self-employed in the data.
3.2 Agents' optimization
3.2.1 Employers
Employers choose the units of labor and capital they hire in order to maximize their current
proﬁts pi. The optimal number of workers and capital stock, n(x) and k(x) respectively,
depend positively on the productivity level x, as equations (3) and (4) show:
n (x) =
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
]1/(1−η)
, (3)
k (x) =
[
xηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
]1/(1−η)
. (4)
16The consumption good produced by the self-employed and the capital they use is the same as the one in
the employers' problem. However, it is convenient to denote them y˜ and k˜ to clarify the exposition.
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3.2.2 Self-employed
When we solve for the problem of a self-employed agent with talent x who wishes to maximize
his or her proﬁts, we ﬁnd
k˜(x) =
(τxαη
r
) 1
1−αη
. (5)
3.2.3 Occupational choice
Figure (1) displays the shape of the proﬁt functions of employers (pie(x)) and self-employed
(pis(x)) along with wage earned by workers as a function of talent x.
17 The ﬁgure also shows
the relevant talent cutoﬀs for the occupational choices Here we present the equations that
deﬁne these thresholds: the ﬁrst one, z1, deﬁnes the earnings such that agents are indiﬀerent
between becoming workers or self-employed and it is given by
w = τz1k˜ (z1)
αη − rk˜ (z1) . (6)
If x ≤ z1 agents choose to become workers, while if x > z1 they become self-employed or
employers. The second cutoﬀ, z2, determines the choice between being a self-employed or an
employer and it is given by
τz2k˜(z2)
αη − rk˜(z2) = z2x
(
k(z2)
αn(z2)
1−α)η − rk (z2)− wn(z2) (7)
so that if x > z2 an agent wants to become an employer.
3.3 Female labor market frictions
Our model assumes that men and women are identical in all dimensions except that women
face several exogenous restrictions on their occupational choices. The ﬁrst constraint we
impose is that only a fraction µ of them can freely choose their occupation, while a fraction
1 − µ are excluded from employership. Out of the latter group of women, a fraction µo
have the possibility of becoming self-employed, while a fraction 1 − µo are also excluded
from self-employment. As a result, a fraction (1− µ) (1− µo) of women are shut out from
entrepreneurship, i.e. both employership and self-employment, and can only become workers.18
17In order to construct this ﬁgure we are implicitly using values for the parameters τ, α, and η, such that
the three occupations are chosen in equilibrium.
18Figure (5) in Appendix A shows the optimal occupation choices of women given the frictions they face.
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Figure 1: The occupational map
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Note that, in this setup, we are not allowing for the possibility of women being excluded from
self-employment but not from employership, since we think that whichever are the barriers
women face to become self-employed, they should apply even more strongly to become an
employer.19
Finally, the third friction we introduce is that only a fraction λ of women are allowed
to participate in the labor market, while a fraction (1− λ) of randomly selected women are
excluded from all the possible occupations in the labor market.20 Again, this friction may
reﬂect discrimination, or other supply factors, but it might also reﬂect diﬀerences in optimal
choices of women, or other demand factors. Since our model does not incorporate a household
sector, women who do not participate in the labor market produce zero output. Because of
this, the income loss due to the λ gender gap estimated by our model is actually a market
output loss, which is likely to be larger than the total output loss because of the potential
production taking place inside the household when women do not participate in the labor
market.21
Because of the way we introduced these gender gaps into model, all women face the same
probability of being excluded from participation and entrepreneurship. This would be the
right modeling choice if some women were banned from entrepreneurship or work due to pure
19In terms of the parameters of the model, if µ = 1, then the value of µo does not aﬀect the occupational
choices of women.
20We say that women excluded from the labor force are randomly selected because their talent is drawn
from the same distribution as the rest of the population.
21To the extent that entrepreneurship gaps aﬀect negatively the labor market participation return of women,
a model with household production and endogenous female participation is likely to predict larger output losses
due to the introduction of µ and µo gender gaps.
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discrimination, if some of them did not have access to education or credit, if some of them
had a strong preference for childcare or other forms of home production, or if some lacked
the accurate information about entrepreneurship options. Admittedly, the aggregate impact
would be larger if more talented women were less likely to be excluded, which would be the
case if these distortions aﬀected women's earnings in the form of a ﬁxed cost or a wedge. It
could also be the case, however, that more talented women were more likely to get excluded,
which would be the case if, for example, they had a higher propensity to marry richer men
and, as a result, they were also more likely not to participate in the labor market or to choose
part-time work.22
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
We assume that women represent half of the population in the economy and that there is no
unemployment. Moreover, any agent in the economy can potentially participate in the labor
market, except for the restrictions on women described above. Under these assumptions, in
equilibrium, the total demand of capital by employers and self-employed must be equal to the
aggregate capital endowment (in per capita terms) k:
k =
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
k˜(x)dΓ(x)

+
λ
2
µ ∞ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) + (µ+ (1− µ)µ0)
z2ˆ
z1
k˜(x)dΓ(x) + (1− µ)µ0
∞ˆ
z2
k˜(x)dΓ(x)
 , (8)
where the ﬁrst bracket represents the demand for capital by male entrepreneurs and the second
one is the demand for capital by female entrepreneurs, which has three components, each of
them multiplied by the fraction of women in the labor force, λ
2
. The ﬁrst one represents the
capital demand by female employers, i.e. those with enough ability to be employers and who
are allowed to be so, while the second and third terms represent the demand by female self-
employed; the second term shows the demand for capital by women who have the right ability
to be self-employed and are allowed to work as such, and the third term shows the demand
from women who become self-employed because they are excluded from employership.23
Similarly, in the labor market, the total demand of workers must also be equal to its total
22Note, however, that by assuming perfect substitution between male and female labor and management
we could be biasing downwards the estimated eﬀects of gender gaps if women had comparative advantage in
diﬀerent sectors than men or if they provided a diﬀerent type of labor.
23The functions k (·) and k˜ (·) are deﬁned in equations (4) and (5).
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supply:
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
+ λ
2
µ
 ∞ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
 =
1
2
Γ(z1) +
λ
2
[Γ(z1) + (1− µ)(1− µ0)(1− Γ(z1))] , (9)
where the upper terms represent the total labor demand and the lower ones the total labor
supply. The ﬁrst term is the labor demand by male employers and the second one corresponds
to the labor demand by female employers, i.e. those women with enough ability to be employ-
ers who are allowed to participate in the labor market and to choose their occupation freely.
The ﬁrst term of the labor supply shows the fraction of men who choose to become workers,
while the second one shows the fraction of female workers. The latter is composed by the
fraction of females who want to be workers as well as the fraction of females who have enough
ability to be employers or self-employed but are excluded from both occupations. For these
group of women, the only option is to become workers.24
In this economy, aggregate production per capita, which is the sum of output by male
employers and self-employed, as well as output by female employers and female self-employed:
y ≡ Y
N
=
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
y(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
y˜(x)dΓ(x)
 +
λ
2
µ ∞ˆ
z2
y(x)dΓ(x) + µ
z2ˆ
z1
y˜(x)dΓ(x) + (1− µ)µ0
∞ˆ
z1
y˜(x)dΓ(x)
 (10)
where y(x) and y˜(x) are deﬁned in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a pair of cutoﬀ levels (z1, z2), a set of quan-
tities
[
n (x) , k (x) , k˜ (x)
]
,∀x, and prices (w, r) such that equations (3) - (9) are satisﬁed; that
is agents choose their occupation optimally, entrepreneurs choose the amount of capital and
labor to maximize their proﬁts, and all markets clear.
3.5 Comparative statics
In this subsection we show qualitatively how the agents' occupational choice are aﬀected
by exogenous changes in the two entrepreneurship gender gaps, namely the fraction of women
who are excluded from employership (1 − µ) and the fraction of those women who are also
24The function n (·) is deﬁned in equation (3).
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Figure 2: Qualitative eﬀects of µ and µo − gaps
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excluded from self-employment (1−µ0). Figure (2) shows the change in the talent thresholds
(z1, z2) when (1− µ) and (1− µ0) become positive.
3.5.1 An increase in the employership gender gap (↓ µ)
A decrease in µ initially generates a decline in the number of employers and hence a decrease
in the labor demand and the equilibrium wage, which decreases the cutoﬀ z1. Everything else
equal, this results in an increase in proﬁts for the remaining employers, which reduces also the
cutoﬀ z2. The eﬀect on the demand for capital is ambiguous since the demand from employers
declines but that of the self-employed increases. If the demand for capital actually decreases,
the cost of renting capital goes down, so both self-employed and employers' proﬁts increase
and, hence, both cutoﬀs z1 and z2 decrease further.
3.5.2 An increase in self-employment gender gaps (↓ µ0)
A decrease in µ0 (given µ < 1) generates a decline in the number of self-employed and
hence an increase in the labor supply, which in turn drives wages down. As in the previous
case, this has a direct negative eﬀect on the cutoﬀ z1 as well as an indirect negative eﬀect
on the cutoﬀ z2, through its eﬀect on the employers' proﬁt function. As before, whether the
demand for capital increases or decreases is a quantitative question since there is a negative
eﬀect from the drop in self-employed and a positive one from the rise in employers.
4 Benchmark model numerical results
In this section, we simulate the benchmark model to calculate the income eﬀects of the
gender gaps in the labor market discussed in the previous section. We ﬁrst describe the
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Explanation
B 1 Normalization
η 0.79 From Buera and Shin (2011)
α 0.114 To match capital share: αη + (1− η) = 0.3
ρ 6.5 To match employers' share OECD countries
τ 0.7 To match self-employed share OECD countries
parametrization of the model and calculate the maximum possible eﬀects of these gaps. Then
we estimate the gender gaps and quantify their eﬀects using data from OECD countries. In
Section 5 we extend the model to make it more suitable for developing countries, and we then
use data from non-OECD countries to quantify eﬀects of the gender gaps on these countries.
4.1 Skill distribution
To simulate the model, we use a Pareto function for the talent distribution, as in Lucas
(1978) and Buera et al. (2011). In particular, the cumulative distribution of talent is given
by
Γ (x) = 1−Bρx−ρ, x ≥ 0, (11)
where ρ,B > 0.
4.2 Model Parametrization
Table 1 shows the parameter values used in the model simulations. The parameter B of
the talent distribution is normalized to 1, while the parameter η is taken from Buera and
Shin (2011).25 The capital-output elasticity parameter α is set to 0.114 in order to match
the 30% capital income share observed in the U.S. data. Since entrepreneurs' proﬁts are
considered capital income, we set αη+ (1− η) equal to 30% as in Buera and Shin (2011). The
parameter ρ of the talent distribution is set to 6.5 to minimize the distance between the actual
and the predicted fraction of employers in the OECD countries, which is 4.5% on average.
Similarly, the self-employed relative productivity parameter τ is chosen to match the fraction
of self-employed workers in the OECD countries, which is 10.8% on average.
The cross-country dispersion in the share of employers and self-employed workers is not
negligible, with 10th-to-90th interpercentile ranges of 2.3 and 3.17 respectively. This dis-
persion can obviously not be generated by the parametrization of ρ and τ . As explained in
subsection 4.4, however, the gender gaps (µ, µo, λ) are country speciﬁc and they do generate
25Buera and Shin (2011) choose η to match the top ﬁve percent income share in the U.S., which is 30%.
This is a reasonable approximation given that the top earners are entrepreneurs both in the model and the
U.S. data.
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some variation across countries in the predicted entrepreneurship rates. These gaps partly
explain the dispersion in entrepreneurship across countries, with a correlation between actual
and predicted shares of 10% in the case of employers and 6.7% in the self-employed workers
case. To give an idea of the model goodness of ﬁt for the OECD sample, the average absolute
deviation of the model is 44% for the share of employers and 61% for the self-employed share.
When computing the numerical results in the next two subsections, we distinguish between
the short run and the long run. In the short run, capital is taken as constant and, therefore,
not aﬀected by the introduction of the gender gaps (µ, µo, λ); in the long run, on the other
hand, the capital stock takes its steady-state value and, therefore, is negatively aﬀected by
the introduction of the gender gaps.26 To compute the steady-state capital stock, we assume
a gross interest rate of 0.125, which is consistent with a depreciation rate of 0.075 and an
intertemporal discount factor of 0.05 in a continuous-time model.27 Given that the output
elasticity to the capital stock is only αη = 0.09, the long-run results do not diﬀer much to the
short-run ones.
4.3 Income eﬀects from gender gaps
Table 2 shows the eﬀect on (market) income per worker caused by the introduction of
the diﬀerent gender gaps considered in this paper. As stated above, women are assumed to
be identical to men in all dimensions, so in the absence of gender gaps, their occupational
choices would be the same as those of males. When the gender gaps (µ, µ0, λ) are introduced,
however, the eﬃcient allocation is distorted and, as a result, there is a decline in aggregate
income per worker and per capita.
The ﬁrst row shows that if all women were excluded from employership (µ = 0) but not
from self-employment (µ0 = 1) the income per capita loss would be 7.1% in the short run and
8.62 in the long run. In the second row we see that if all women were excluded from becoming
entrepreneurs (µ = 0 and µ0 = 0), i.e. both employers and self-employed, income per worker
would fall by 10.1% in the short run and 11% in the long run. Naturally, the largest eﬀect
on (market) income per capita occurs when all women are excluded from the labor market
λ = 0, which, given our assumptions, is equivalent to reducing the labor force by 50%. As we
can see in the third row of the table, in this case, income per capita falls by almost 47% in
the short run and 50% in the long run.
26The value for the stock of capital used in the short run is irrelevant, since the income loss predicted by
the model due to the introduction of gender gaps is not aﬀected by its value.
27The intertemporal discount factor we use is similar to the one proposed by Cooley and Prescott (1995),
while the value for the depreciation rate is roughly an average of values found in the literature; for example,
0.048 in Cooley and Prescott (1995) and 0.1 in Christiano et al. (2005).
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Table 2: Potential income losses from gender gaps
Short Run Long Run
Due to highest possible employership-gap
(µ = 1, → µ = 0; µ0 = 1, λ = 1) 7.1% 8.6%
Due to highest possible entrepreneurship-gap
(µ = 1, µ0 = 1→ µ = 0, µ0 = 0; λ = 1) 10.1% 11%
Due to highest possible lfp-gap
(λ = 1 → λ = 0; µ = 1, µo = 1) 46.8% 50%
4.4 Cross-country results: OECD sample
In this section, we use labor market data for 33 OECD countries for the year 2010 to quantify
the income eﬀects of the observed gender gaps.28 The variables used are: labor force par-
ticipation by gender, fraction of employers (or self-employed with employees) by gender and
fraction of own-account workers (or self-employed without employees) by gender, which we
denote as self-employed in our paper. Although, in line with the theoretical literature, one
could have expected low gender gaps in the labor market in OECD countries compared to
the rest of the world, these gaps are still sizable in many cases, as we will see in the next
subsection.
4.4.1 Country-speciﬁc gender gaps
For each country in our sample, we compute the parameters associated with the gender gaps
(µ, µo, λ) comparing the male and female data on labor force participation, share of employers
and share of self-employed. The numerical results for each OECD country are presented in
Appendix B.
The parameter λ, which denotes the fraction of women not excluded from the labor force,
is computed as the ratio of female labor force relative to the male labor force. The average
labor force participation-gender gap, deﬁned as 1−λ is 0.22, i.e. out of every hundred men who
participate in the labor market there are only 78 women doing so. This gap ranges from 0.61
in Turkey to 0.08 in Iceland, Finland and Norway. Similarly, the parameter µ is computed as
the share of female employers deﬁned as female employers over female employment over
the share of male employers. The average gap in employers (1 − µ) is 0.62, varying from a
value of 0.81 in Turkey to 0.38 in Australia. Finally, the parameter µo is inferred from the
28OECD (2014), "Gender Equality: Gender equality in entrepreneurship", OECD Social and Welfare Statis-
tics (database).
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Table 3: Average income losses from gender gaps - OECD sample
%
Short-run income loss Long-run income loss
Due to (µ, µo) Due to (µ, µo, λ) Due to (µ, µo) Due to (µ, µo, λ)
Top 25% 5.06 19.7 5.72 21.5
50 to 75 percentile 4.88 13.8 5.47 15.1
25 to 50 percentile 5.20 12.5 5.80 13.7
Bottom 25% 5.17 9.61 5.77 10.6
data to match the female share of self-employment relative to the male one, given the value
of µ. The entrepreneurship-gender gap, deﬁned as the fraction of women excluded from
both employership and self-employment, is calculated as (1− µ) (1− µo) and it is equal to
0.43 on average, ranging from 0.69 in Ireland to 0 in Chile.29 The employership-gender gap,
deﬁned as the fraction of women excluded from employership but not from self-employment,
is calculated as (1− µ)µo, is equal to 0.18 on average, ranging from 0.53 in Turkey to 0 in
Ireland and Poland.
4.4.2 Cross-country results
The cross-country results for the OECD sample are summarized in Table 3, which shows
the eﬀects of introducing all the gender gaps analyzed the (µ, µ0, λ) gaps and the eﬀects of
introducing the occupational gender gaps to employership and self-employment the (µ, µo)
gaps both in the short run, when the capital stock is ﬁxed, and the long run, when the
capital stock takes its steady-state value. Countries are classiﬁed in four groups depending
on their total income loss: countries above the 75th percentile, countries between the 50th
and 75th percentile, countries between the 25th and 50th percentile and those below the 25th
percentile. As it is apparent from the table, not surprisingly, the long run costs for each group
are substantially larger than the short run ones. The table also reveals that the fraction of the
total income losses represented by the restrictions on entrepreneurship represent about 40%
of the total income loss, with the reminding loss being generated by the gaps in labor force
participation.
The costs for each OECD country are presented in Appendix B. The average income loss
due to the gender gaps in this sample of countries is 15.4% in the long run and 14.1% in
the short run, while the income loss due to gender gaps in employership and self-employment
are 5.7% in the long run and 5% in the short run. The countries with the largest average
total losses in the long run are Turkey (33.1%), Mexico (25.5%), and Italy (21.2%), while
29A zero gap in Chile reﬂects the fact that, according to our calculations, in this country no women is
excluded from both employership and self-employment.
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Iceland (9.2%), Norway (9.7%), and Finland (9.7%) display the smallest losses. The countries
with the largest average losses generated by distortions in entrepreneurship in the long run
are Israel (7.4%), Turkey (7.3%), and Estonia (7.2%). Chile (2.7%), Australia (3.5%), and
Poland (4.7%) display the smallest losses associated with distortions in entrepreneurship.
5 Extension: out-of-necessity self-employment
5.1 Model with out-of-necessity self-employment
In this section, we present and simulate an extended version the model to make it more suitable
for developing countries, which display a much larger fraction of self-employed workers than
developed countries.30 One possible explanation for this diﬀerence is the existence of the so-
called out-of-necessity entrepreneurs, who choose this occupation because they had no other
occupational choices apart from taking advantage of a business opportunity.31 To capture
this phenomenon, in the extended model, a fraction 1− θ of both males and females are not
allowed to become workers and, as we can see in Figure (6) in Appendix A, they choose to
become self-employed.
The agents' optimization problem and occupation map in this version of the model is
exactly the same as the one discussed in Section 3. However, the market-clearing conditions
are now diﬀerent to reﬂect the new restrictions in the labor market. The capital market
clearing can be written as
k =
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
k˜(x)dΓ(x) + (1− θ)
z1ˆ
B
k˜(x)dΓ(x)

+
λ
2
µ ∞ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) + (µ+ (1− µ)µ0)
z2ˆ
z1
k˜(x)dΓ(x)

+
λ
2
(1− µ)µ0 ∞ˆ
z2
k˜(x)dΓ(x) + (1− θ) (µ+ (1− µ)µ0)
z1ˆ
B
k˜(x)dΓ(x)

where the upper term is the demand for capital by men and the lower term is the women's
demand for capital . Compared to equation (8), the demand for capital has now two new
components: the last terms in the ﬁrst and second lines, which correspond to the capital
demand of male and female out-of-necessity self-employed. A fraction (1− θ) of males with
30According to the data, the overall fraction of self-employed (own-account workers in the ILO dataset) is
less than 11% in OECD countries and almost 35% in developing countries.
31Using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey, Poschke (2013) ﬁns that necessity en-
trepreneurs represent almost 50% of all entrepreneurs in non-OECD countries.
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ability below z1 become self-employed since they would like to be workers but are not allowed
to do so and choose their second-best option. Moreover, a fraction (1− θ) of females with
ability below z1 would like to be workers but, since they are excluded from this occupation,
they choose to become out-of-necessity self-employed if they are eligible to do so, i.e. if they
are not excluded from entrepreneurship32 These out-of-necessity self-employed demand the
optimal amount of capital given their talent or ability. Similarly, the labor market-clearing
condition is given by
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
+ λ
2
µ
 ∞ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
 =
1
2
θΓ(z1) +
λ
2
θ [Γ(z1) + (1− µ)(1− µ0)(1− Γ(z1))] ,
where the ﬁrst line represents the aggregate labor demand and the second line represents the
aggregate labor supply. Compared to equation (9), the only diﬀerence here is that the labor
supply terms are multiplied by the parameter θ, given that a fraction (1− θ) of both males
and females are not allowed to become workers.
5.2 Extended model numerical results
To simulate the extended model, we use the talent distribution function described in equation
(11) and the parameter values of Table 1 used in the simulations of the benchmark model.
Table 4 shows the eﬀects of the occupational gaps on income per capita when the parameter
θ is smaller than 1, i.e. when at least a fraction of agents who want to be workers are not
allowed to do so. Interestingly, the eﬀect of the employership gap decreases with the θ-friction,
since a fall in θ reduces the general equilibrium eﬀect of the µ-gap on the wage rate and,
hence, reduces the negative eﬀect on the aggregate productivity of entrepreneurs.33 The eﬀect
of the of the entrepreneurship gap, however, increases with θ, given that excluding females
from employership and self-employment implies excluding from the labor force a fraction
(1− θ) (1− µ) (1− µo), as we can see in Figure (6) in Appendix A.
32Note that since the entrepreneurship friction is (1− µ) (1− µo), a fraction 1 − (1− µ) (1− µo)=µ +
(1− µ)µo are not excluded from self-employment.
33Intuitively, a fall in θ reduces the supply of workers and, as a result, the introduction of the µ-gap creates
a smaller fall in the equilibrium wage. This limits the incorporation of less talented employers and, hence,
limits the fall in aggregate productivity.
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Table 4: Potential income losses from gender gaps
Short Run Long Run
θ = .75 θ = .25 θ = .75 θ = .25
Due to highest possible employership-gap
(µ = 1, → µ = 0; µ0 = 1, λ = 1) 6.1% 3% 7.4% 3.7
Due to highest possible entrepreneurship-gap
(µ = 1, µ0 = 1→ µ = 0, µ0 = 0; λ = 1) 17% 33.5% 18.6% 36.1
5.3 Cross-country results: non-OECD sample
In this section, we use labor market data for 106 non-OECD countries from the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (KILM, 8th Edition) for the latest available year. As in section
4.4, the variables used are the country's labor force participation, fraction of employers (or
self-employed with employees) and fraction of own-account workers (self-employed without
employees) by gender, which we denote as self-employed in our paper.34 As before, for each
country, we then compute the gender gap parameters (µ, µo, λ) comparing the male and female
data on labor force participation, share of employers and share of self-employed. The param-
eter θ is jointly estimated with the other parameters to match the fraction of self-employed in
each country. The numerical results for non-OECD countries are presented in Appendix C.
The average cross-country results obtained are summarized in Table (5), where the coun-
tries are split in 7 geographic regions, Central Asia (6), East Asia and the Paciﬁc (13), Europe
(13), Latin America and the Caribbean (26), Middle East and North Africa (13), South Asia
(7), and Sub-Saharan Africa (28).35 For each region, columns (2) and (4) show the average
income loss (in the short and long run, respectively) due to the occupational gender gaps.
(µ, µo), while columns (3) and (5) show the average income loss due to all the gender gaps
(µ, µo, λ). Our results suggest the existence of remarkable diﬀerences across regions in income
losses due to gender gaps, especially in those generated by the female labor participation gap.
The region with the largest income loss is the Middle East and North Africa where, according
to our estimates, the total income loss is 35% in the short run and 38% in the long run, a ﬁfth
34In KILM, the category self-employed is subdivided in four groups: employers, own-account workers,
members of producers' cooperatives, and contributing family workers. Given the deﬁnition of each of these
groups, we have decided that the most sensible choice was to use own-account workers to represent the self-
employed in our model, and assume that members of producers' cooperatives, and contributing family workers
are workers.
35We follow the World Bank to assign each country to a region, with the exception of countries that belong
in the Europe and Central Asia group, which we split in two geographical regions, Europe and Central Asia,
since we believe the labor markets in these two regions are very diﬀerent. The numbers in parentheses indicate
the number of countries assigned to each region.
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Table 5: Average income losses from labor market gender gaps- non-OECD sample (by World
Bank region)
%
Short-run income loss Long-run income loss
Due to (µ, µo) Due to (µ, µo, λ) Due to (µ, µo) Due to (µ, µo, λ)
Central Asia 6.22 9.04 7.06 10.12
East Asia and Paciﬁc 7.09 14.60 7.84 15.95
Europe 4.86 9.83 5.43 10.82
Latin America & C. 4.67 15.76 5.29 17.28
Middle East & N. Africa 6.90 35.11 7.72 37.83
South Asia 8.79 22.94 9.75 24.91
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.29 10.82 5.96 11.95
of which is due to the occupational choice gaps. South Asia has the second largest income
losses due to gender gaps, 23% in the short run and 25% in the long run, almost 40% of which
is due to occupational gaps. Central Asia , on the other hand, is the region with the lowest
total income loss due to gender gaps, 9% in the short run and 10.1 in the long run, almost
70% of which is due to occupational gaps.
Appendix C contains the results for all countries in the non-OECD sample, together with
the country-speciﬁc parameter estimates. The average θ is 0.75, indicating that only 25% of
agents who want to be workers end up being self-employed instead. The average µ is 0.44,
the average µo is 0.54 and the average λ is 0.74. The average income loss from all gender gaps
is 16.05% in the short run and 17.53% in the long run, while the average income loss due to
occupational gaps is 5.8% in the short run and 6.5% in the long run. These ﬁgures are higher
than for the sample of OECD countries, although the fact that we use diﬀerent versions of
the models to calculate the costs in each group suggests that this comparison should be taken
cautiously. With respect to the long-run total income losses from gender gaps, Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Qatar and Iran are the countries with the largest ones, all of them over 40%,
while Ghana, Liberia and Rwanda are the countries with the smallest ﬁgures, all of them
around 1%. With respect to the long-run income losses due to occupational gender gaps,
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Pakistan are the countries with the largest ones, all of them
above 17%, while Lesotho, Nepal, Rwanda and Bhutan are the countries with the smallest
ones, in all cases below 1%.
After merging the OECD and the non-OECD, we summarize the results in Figures (3) and
(4). Figure (3) shows the long-run total income loss due to gender gaps of each country in a
world map, where we can see the largest losses are in Middle East and Northern Africa, South
Asia and Latin America. Figure (4), on the other hand, plots the income losses against GDP
per capita in 2010. The ﬁrst plot shows that there is an inverse-U relationship between the
level of development of a country and the total income loss caused by the gender gaps, while
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Figure 3: World map of total income losses due to gender gaps
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the second plot shows a negative relationship between the development level and the income
losses caused by the gender gaps in entrepreneurship. This suggests that the inverse-U in the
ﬁrst plot is mostly driven by the U-shaped relationship between development and female labor
force participation discussed, for example, in Goldin (1995).36
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an occupational choice model and uses it to quantify the eﬀects of gender
gaps in the labor market on aggregate productivity and income per capita. Our numerical
results show that gender gaps in entrepreneurship have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the allocation
of resources and thus on aggregate productivity, while the gap from labor force participation
has a large eﬀect on income per capita. Speciﬁcally, if no women worked as an employer
or a self-employed, our benchmark model predicts that income per worker would drop by
around 10% in the short run and 11% in the long run, while if the labor force participation
of women was zero, income per capita would decrease by almost 47% in the short run and
50% in the long run. When we carry out the country-by-country analysis, we ﬁnd that there
are important diﬀerences across countries and geographical regions. Gender inequality creates
an average income loss of 14% in the short run and 15.4% in the long run for the OECD
36Countries at diﬀerent stages of their development process diﬀer in many aspects, including the optimal
choices of women in the labor market. In this sense, the interpretation of our gender gaps may not be the same
across countries in diﬀerent income groups and, as a result, the comparison between OECD and non-OECD
should be taken with caution. An alternative to comparing gender gaps in a cross-section of countries at
diﬀerent stages of development, would be to use time series or panel data to compare these gaps - and their
costs for one or several countries over time. An endogenous growth model where we introduce gender gaps in
the labor market would be the appropriate conceptual tool in that case since it would allow use to analyze
the two-directional link between gender inequality and economic growth. We leave this for future research.
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Figure 4: Income losses and development level
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sample, and an average income loss of of 16% in the short run and 17.5% in the long run for
the sample of developing countries. On average, 44% of those losses are due to gender gaps
in occupational choices. The region with the largest income loss due to gender inequality is
Middle East and North Africa, with an average income loss of 38% in the long run, followed
by South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, with long-run income losses of 25% and
17.3%, respectively.
Our results suggest that the costs associated with gender gaps in the labor markets are
substantial. As explained in OECD (2014), there are several public policies that can increase
gender equality in the labor market: fostering a gender neutral legal framework for business,
reducing administrative burdens on ﬁrms and excessive regulatory restrictions, ensuring equal
access to ﬁnance for female and male entrepreneurs, and pair relevant ﬁnancing schemes with
support measures such as ﬁnancial literacy, training, mentoring, coaching and consultancy
services, and increasing access to support networks, including professional advice on legal and
ﬁscal matters. A recent example of a country that has implemented some of these policies is
Norway, where in 2006, its government established a quota system that made it mandatory
for companies to have at least 40% of women in their boards (Bertrand et al., 2014). Other
countries have now implemented regulations that force companies listed in the stock exchange
to comply with Corporate Governance Codes (CDC's). In view of our ﬁndings, public policies
along these lines may increase eﬃciency in the labor market and result in substantial gains in
productivity and, potentially, women's welfare.
As discussed before, in this paper, we abstract from modeling the decision of agents to
participate in the labor force, as well as any diﬀerential aspect in the occupational choices of
women. An interesting extension would be to introduce a household production sector in the
model, which is likely to lead to a division of labor between husbands and wives, as in Becker
(1981). This would obviously reduce the welfare eﬀects of the labor force participation gender
gap, although it would also reduce the female value of participating in the labor market and,
hence, the optimal female labor supply. Similarly, we also abstract from sectoral diﬀerences
in terms of female labor intensity, which seem to exist in the real world. Taking into account
the imperfect substitution of male and female labor, together with the diﬀerences in female
labor intensity by sector, would probably raise the losses predicted by the model. On the
other hand, if one assumed that women have less entrepreneurial talent than men perhaps
due to gender gaps in education then our framework is likely to overestimate the negative
impact of gender gaps in entrepreneurship on aggregate income.
24
7 Acknowledgments
We thank the editor, Joe Kaboski, and the editor-in-chief, Isaac Ehrlich, for their excellent
guidance to improve our paper. We also thank seminar participants at Universitat Autonoma
de Barcelona, University of Sheﬃeld, University of Birmingham, Bank of Italy, Clemson
University, Universitat de Barcelona, University of Cagliari, The World Bank, Washington
State University, Liverpool Management School, John Carroll University, Clark University,
as well as conference participants at the Labor Markets in the Aftermath of the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis (IMF), and Structural Change, Dynamics, and Economic Growth, and the
helpful comments of Raquel Fernandez, Xavier Gine, Ian Gregory-Smith, Stephen Machin,
Luigi Pistaferri, Xavier Raurich, Fernando Sanchez-Losada, Curtis Simon, Robert Tamura
and Montserrat Vilalta-Bufí, as well as several referees. Teignier acknowledges ﬁnancial sup-
port from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Grant ECO2012-36719, and
from Generalitat of Catalonia, Grant SGR2014-493. All remaining errors are ours.
References
Abu-Ghaida, D, and S. Klasen, 2004. The Costs of Missing the Millennium Development
Goal on Gender Equity, World Development 32(7), 1075107.
Amaral, P., and E. Quintin, 2010. Limited Enforcement, Financial Intermediation and
Economic Development: A Quantitative Assessment, International Economic Review, 51(3),
785-811.
Antunes, A., T. Cavalcanti, and A. Villamil, 2008. The Eﬀect of Financial Repression
and Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 55(2), 278-298.
Barsh, J., and L. Yee, 2012. Unlocking the Full Potential of Women at Work. McKinsey
& Company/Wall Street Journal.
Barro, R. J., and J. W. Lee, 1993. International Comparisons of Educational Attainment.
Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3): 363-394.
Barro, R. J., and X. Sala-i-Martin, 2003. Economic Growth. Second Edition. The MIT
Press: Cambridge.
Becker, G. S., 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Becker, G S., Hubbard, H. J., and Murphy, K. M. 2010. The Market for College Graduates
and the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women." American Economic Review,
25
100(2): 229-33.
Becker, G.S., and H.G. Lewis. 1973. On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality
of Children. Journal of Political Economy, 81: S279S88.
Becker, G. S., W. H. J. Hubbard, and K. M. Murphy, 2010. Explaining the Worldwide
Boom in Higher Education of Women. Journal of Human Capital, 4(3), Fall, 203-241.
Bertrand, M, S. E. Black, S. Jensen, and A. Lleras-Muney, 2014.Breaking the Glass
Ceiling? The Eﬀect of Board Quotas on Female Labor Market Outcomes in Norway. NBER
working paper 20256.
Bhattacharya, D., Guner, N., and Ventura, G., 2013. Distortions, Endogenous Managerial
Skills and Productivity Diﬀerences. Review of Economic Dynamics, 16(1), 1125.
Blau, F.D., and L.M. Kahn., 2007. The Gender Pay Gap: Have Women Gone as Far as
They Can? Academy of Management Perspectives 21(1): 7.
Blau, F.D., and L.M. Kahn., 2013. Female Labor Supply: Why Is the US Falling Behind?
NBER Working Paper 18702.
Brush, C.G., P.G. Greene, D.J. Kelley and Y. Litovsky (2011), 2010 Women's Report,
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Executive Report, Babson College, United States.
Buera, F. J., and Y. Shin., 2011. Self-Insurance vs. Self-Financing: A Welfare Analysis of
the Persistence of Shocks. Journal of Economic Theory 146, 845862.
Buera, F.J., and Y. Shin, 2013. Financial Frictions and the Persistence of History: A
Quantitative Exploration. Journal of Political Economy 121(2), 221-272.
Buera, F. J., Kaboski, J. P., and Shin, Y., 2011. Finance and Development: A Tale of
Two Sectors. American Economic Review 101(5), 19642002.
Cavalcanti, T., and Tavares, J., 2011. The Output Cost of Gender Discrimination: A
Model-Based Macroeconomic Estimate. Forthcoming, Economic Journal..
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and C. L. Evans, 2005. Nominal Rigidities and the
Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 113(1): 1-45.
Cole, R.A. and H. Mehran,2009. Gender and the Availability of Credit to Privately Held
Firms:Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Staﬀ Report, No. 383, August.
Coleman, S. and A.M. Robb, 2012. A Rising Tide, Financing Strategies for Women-owned
Firms, Stanford University Press, Stanford, United States.
Cranﬁeld University, 2014. The Female FTSE 100 Report 2014  Crossing the Finish
Line, Cranﬁeld University, School of Management (www.som.cranﬁeld.ac.uk/som/dinamic-
content/research/ftse/The%20Female%20FTSE%20Board%20Report%202014.pdf
Cooley, T. F., and E. C. Prescott (1995) Economic Growth and Business Cycles in
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research , ed. Thomas F. Cooley, 1995, Princeton University
26
Press, 1-38.
Cuberes, D., and Teignier, M., 2014. Gender Inequality and Economic Growth: A Critical
Review. Journal of International Development, 26(2): 260276.
Doepke, M., and M. Tertilt. 2009. Women's Liberation: What's in it for Men? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124(4): 1541-91.
Dollar D., and Gatti, R., 1999. Gender Inequality, Income and Growth: Are Good Times
Good for Women? Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper
Series No. 1. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Elborgh-Woytek, M. Newiak, K. Kochhar, S. Fabrizio, K. Kpodar, P. Wingender, B.
Clements, and G. Schwartz, 2013. Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains
from Gender Equity. IMF Discussion Note, September 2013.
Erosa, A., T. Koreshkova, and D. Restuccia, 2010.: How Important is Human Capital? A
Quantitative Theory Assessment of World Income Inequality. Review of Economic Studies ,
77(4), 1421-1449.
Esteve-Volart, B., 2009. Gender Discrimination and Growth: Theory and Evidence from
India. Manuscript.
Eurobarometer, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
Eurostat,2008., Statistics Explained: Factors of Business Success Survey, Luxembourg.
Fernandez, R., 2009. Women's Rights and Development. NBER Working Paper No
15355.
Galor, O., and Weil, D. N., 1996. The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth. American
Economic Review 85(3), 374387.
Goldin, C., 1990. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American
Women. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Goldin, C., 1995. The U-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Development
and Economic History. In: Schultz, Investment in Women's Human Capital and Economic
Development, University of Chicago Press, 61-90.
Gollin, D., 2008. Nobody's Business but My Own: Self Employment and Small Enterprise
in Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics. 55(2), 219-233.
Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu, 2005. Engines of Liberation. Review of
Economic Studies. 72: 109-33.
Hsieh, C., Hurst, E., Jones, C., and Klenow, P., 2013. The Allocation of Talent and U.S.
Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 18693.
International Labor Organization, Table 3 http://kilm.ilo.org/KILMnetBeta/default2.asp
Klasen, S., 2002. Low Schooling for Girls, Slower Growth for All? Cross-Country Evidence
on the Eﬀect of Gender Inequality in Education on Economic Development. World Bank
Economic Review 16(3), 345373.
27
Klasen, S., and Lamanna, F., 2009. The Impact of Gender Inequality in Education
and Employment on Economic Growth: New Evidence for a Panel of Countries. Feminist
Economics 15 (3), 91-132.
Lagerlöf, N-P., 2003. Gender Equality and Long Run Growth. Journal of Economic
Growth 8, 403-426.
Lagerlöf, N-P., 2006. The Galor-Weil Model Revisited: A Quantitative Exercise. Review
of Economic Dynamics 9(1), 116-142.
Lucas Jr., R. E., 1978. On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. The Bell Journal of
Economics 9(2), 508-523.
Macchiavello, R., Menzel, A., and Woodruﬀ, C., 2014. Managerial Capital and Produc-
tivity: Evidence from a Training Program in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector. Working
Paper.
Morrisson, C., and Murtin, F., 2009. "The Century of Education." Journal of Human
Capital 3(1), 1-42.
Ngai, R., and Petrongolo, B., 2013. Gender Gaps and the Rise of the Service Economy.
CEP DP1204.
Olivetti, C., and Petrongolo, B., 2008. Unequal Pay or Unequal Employment? A Cross-
country Analysis of Gender Gaps. Journal of Labor Economics 26(4), October, 621-654.
Olivetti, C., and Petrongolo, B., 2014. Gender Gaps across Countries and Skills: Demand,
Supply and the Industry Structure. Review of Economic Dynamics 17(4), October, 842859.
OECD 2012. Closing the Gender Gap, Act Now, OECD Publishing, Paris.
OECD 2013., OECD Education at a Glance  Education Indicators, OECD Publishing,
Paris,
OECD 2014., Enhancing Women's Economic Empowerment through Entrepreneurship and
Business Leadership in OECD Countries, Background Report to China Development research
Foundation project on Enhancing Women's Economic Empowerment through Entrepreneur-
ship and Leadership in the Midst of China's New Urbanization.
Parro, F., 2012. International Evidence on the Gender Gap in Education over the Past Six
Decades: A Puzzle and an Answer to It. Journal of Human Capital, 6(2), Summer, 150-185.
Penn World Tables, 8.0. https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/
Poschke, M., 2013. Entrepreneurs out of necessity: a snapshot. Applied Economics
Letters 20(7), 658-663.
Thévenon, O., Nabil A., Adema, W., and del Pero A. S., 2012, Eﬀects of Reducing Gender
Gaps in Education and Labour Force Participation on Economic Growth in the OECD,
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 138, OECD Publishing,
Paris.
28
Tzannatos, Z., 1999. Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth
Helps, Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters. World Development 27 (3), 551-569.
World Bank, 2001. Engendering Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
29
A Occupational choice maps of women
The two ﬁgures below illustrate how women's constraints are linked to their talent draw and
what they imply in terms of their occupational choice. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the occupational
choice map of women in the benchmark model, while the second ﬁgure shows the one in the
extended model with necessity entrepreneurs.
Figure 5: Occupational choice map of women - benchmark model
(  ,∞)
Cannot be 
employers
 
Can be either 
employers or 
self-employed
1 −  
1 −   
  
Cannot be self-
employed
Become workers
Can be self-
employed
Become self-
employed
(  ,∞) Become 
employers
(  ,   )
Become self-
employed
Figure 6: Occupational choice map of women - extended model
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B Cross-country results: OECD sample37
(Year 2010) µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
Australia 0.62 0.02 0.81 3.18 11.27 3.50 12.32
Austria 0.40 0.50 0.80 4.57 12.61 5.22 13.92
Belgium 0.39 0.24 0.78 5.08 13.81 5.67 15.14
Canada 0.38 0.35 0.87 4.98 10.23 5.61 11.31
Chile 0.64 1.00 0.63 2.25 18.48 2.68 20.24
Czech Republic 0.36 0.22 0.73 5.44 16.48 6.06 18.02
Denmark 0.30 0.21 0.87 6.02 11.31 6.70 12.45
Estonia 0.24 0.39 0.83 6.34 13.15 7.16 14.53
Finland 0.35 0.25 0.92 5.49 8.77 6.14 9.70
France 0.32 0.25 0.83 5.74 12.32 6.41 13.55
Germany 0.38 0.34 0.80 5.03 12.99 5.66 14.29
Greece 0.39 0.36 0.69 4.93 17.69 5.55 19.36
Hungary 0.48 0.20 0.79 4.31 12.89 4.79 14.12
Iceland 0.39 0.20 0.92 5.10 8.35 5.68 9.21
Ireland 0.31 0.00 0.77 6.27 15.24 6.86 16.61
Israel 0.23 0.32 0.85 6.56 12.48 7.37 13.77
Italy 0.41 0.26 0.64 4.81 19.43 5.38 21.20
Japan 0.29 0.23 0.70 6.06 18.09 6.75 19.76
Korea 0.39 0.27 0.68 5.04 18.13 5.64 19.81
Luxembourg 0.41 0.57 0.76 4.42 14.45 5.07 15.93
Mexico 0.38 0.70 0.54 4.51 23.39 5.25 25.53
Netherlands 0.35 0.36 0.91 5.31 8.84 5.99 9.81
Norway 0.36 0.23 0.92 5.42 8.78 6.05 9.70
Poland 0.50 0.00 0.75 4.33 14.59 4.75 15.91
Portugal 0.41 0.31 0.83 4.77 11.74 5.35 12.92
Slovak Republic 0.43 0.59 0.76 4.26 14.36 4.90 15.83
Slovenia 0.41 0.03 0.81 5.20 12.88 5.71 14.08
Spain 0.49 0.04 0.77 4.36 13.94 4.79 15.22
Sweden 0.30 0.32 0.91 5.82 9.35 6.54 10.37
Switzerland 0.40 0.12 0.81 5.19 12.91 5.74 14.13
37Variable 1: Short-run income loss due to occupational gender gaps (%); variable 2: short-run total income
loss due to gender gaps (%); variable 3: long-run income loss due to occupational gender gaps (%); variable
4: long-run total income loss due to gender gaps (%).
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(Year 2010) µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
Turkey 0.19 0.65 0.39 6.28 30.53 7.29 33.11
United Kingdom 0.40 0.17 0.81 5.05 12.61 5.61 13.83
United States 0.38 0.14 0.82 5.37 12.47 5.95 13.66
C Cross-country results: non-OECD sample38
Country Year Region θ µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
ATG 2001 LAC 1.00 0.51 0.34 0.99 3.86 4.18 4.34 4.69
ARG 2011 LAC 0.92 0.46 0.40 0.72 4.89 16.30 5.49 17.85
ARM 2011 CA 0.79 0.31 0.78 0.95 5.35 7.24 6.20 8.24
AZE 2008 CA 0.57 0.19 1.00 0.98 3.99 4.81 4.82 5.71
BHR 2010 MENA 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.26 6.51 36.00 7.14 38.76
BGD 2005 SA 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.61 21.25 31.10 23.09 33.60
BRB 2004 LAC 1.00 0.25 0.27 0.94 6.49 8.99 7.26 9.98
BLR 2009 EU 1.00 0.46 0.27 0.99 4.35 4.91 4.87 5.48
BLZ 2005 LAC 0.90 0.53 0.48 0.53 4.11 23.69 4.64 25.77
BTN 2011 SA 0.69 0.83 1.00 0.90 0.82 5.20 0.98 5.76
BOL 2009 LAC 0.72 0.41 0.74 0.85 4.98 11.28 5.70 12.53
BWA 2010 SSA 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.85 2.09 8.83 2.49 9.83
BRA 2009 LAC 0.87 0.48 0.30 0.78 5.42 14.30 6.04 15.67
BRN 1991 EAP 1.00 0.38 0.34 0.48 5.02 26.50 5.65 28.76
BGR 2011 EU 1.00 0.47 0.23 0.89 4.31 8.75 4.80 9.64
BFA 2006 SSA 0.41 0.32 0.10 1.00 16.66 16.66 18.17 18.17
KHM 2008 EAP 0.48 0.73 0.00 1.00 6.40 6.40 7.01 7.01
CMR 2001 SSA 0.47 0.53 1.00 0.97 1.88 3.33 2.24 3.83
CPV 2000 SSA 0.79 0.50 0.83 0.86 3.58 9.45 4.16 10.53
TCD 1993 SSA 0.23 0.33 0.54 1.00 11.27 11.27 12.42 12.42
COL 2011 LAC 0.59 0.48 0.86 0.71 3.61 16.00 4.17 17.58
381st column: country codes from Penn World Tables; 2nd column: latest year for which ILO data is
available; 3rd column: World Bank region (EAP: East Asia and Paciﬁc, EU: Europe, CA: Central Asia, LAC:
Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA: Middle East and North Africa, SA: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan
Africa). Variable 1: Short-run income loss due to occupational gender gaps (%); variable 2: short-run total
income loss due to gender gaps (%); variable 3: long-run income loss due to occupational gender gaps (%);
variable 4: long-run total income loss due to gender gaps (%).
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Country Year Region θ µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
COG 2005 SSA 0.45 0.32 1.00 1.00 2.78 2.78 3.35 3.35
CRI 2011 LAC 0.92 0.45 0.56 0.62 4.52 20.08 5.14 21.94
CIV 2002 SSA 0.48 0.63 0.27 0.91 6.78 10.40 7.46 11.40
HRV 2011 EU 0.98 0.51 0.44 0.84 3.93 10.53 4.45 11.63
CYP 2011 EU 1.00 0.22 0.30 0.91 6.73 10.31 7.55 11.43
DJI 1996 MENA 0.81 0.68 1.00 0.55 1.78 21.67 2.12 23.63
DOM 2001 LAC 0.80 0.53 0.22 0.70 5.74 17.58 6.35 19.18
DMA 2010 LAC 0.56 0.55 0.00 0.91 9.63 12.88 10.53 14.06
ECU 2011 LAC 0.73 0.44 0.97 0.64 3.25 18.45 3.86 20.26
EGY 2011 MENA 1.00 0.17 0.83 0.25 6.06 36.34 7.17 39.22
SLV 2011 LAC 0.83 0.59 1.00 0.71 2.34 14.86 2.79 16.36
ETH 2005 SSA 0.47 0.25 0.25 1.00 14.79 14.79 16.21 16.21
FJI 2008 EAP 0.79 0.57 0.00 0.52 6.31 25.52 6.91 27.66
GAB 2005 SSA 0.61 0.55 1.00 0.72 2.14 14.30 2.56 15.75
GEO 2010 CA 0.60 0.26 0.40 1.00 10.57 10.57 11.72 11.72
GHA 2010 SSA 0.41 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.09 1.09
GRD 1998 LAC 0.94 0.62 0.74 0.68 2.66 16.41 3.08 17.98
GTM 2004 LAC 0.78 0.45 1.00 0.54 3.06 23.03 3.67 25.14
HND 2010 LAC 0.67 0.69 1.00 0.57 1.51 20.48 1.80 22.34
HKG 2011 EAP 1.00 0.32 0.06 0.92 6.08 9.20 6.68 10.08
IND 2010 SA 0.32 0.33 0.60 0.42 9.33 30.63 10.35 33.15
IDN 2009 EAP 0.48 0.34 0.43 0.76 10.42 18.99 11.52 20.75
IRN 2008 MENA 0.71 0.15 0.51 0.23 9.83 38.14 11.02 41.05
JAM 2011 LAC 0.63 0.62 0.16 0.86 6.38 11.92 7.02 13.04
KAZ 2011 CA 0.79 0.69 1.00 0.95 1.66 3.72 1.98 4.23
KWT 2011 MENA 1.00 0.81 0.00 0.50 1.55 23.95 1.71 25.99
KGZ 2006 CA 0.67 0.44 0.44 0.81 7.04 14.38 7.84 15.79
LAO 2005 EAP 0.44 0.44 0.04 1.00 13.83 13.83 15.10 15.10
LVA 2011 EU 1.00 0.49 0.32 1.00 4.05 4.05 4.55 4.55
LBN 2007 MENA 0.81 0.14 0.21 0.37 11.07 32.92 12.22 35.55
LSO 1999 SSA 0.27 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.00 9.97 0.00 10.90
LBR 2010 SSA 0.45 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 1.02 1.02
LTU 2011 EU 1.00 0.39 0.41 1.00 4.86 4.86 5.50 5.50
MAC 2011 EAP 1.00 0.33 0.06 0.97 5.94 6.93 6.53 7.62
MKD 2011 EU 0.95 0.50 0.00 0.67 4.95 18.26 5.43 19.87
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Country Year Region θ µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
MDG 2010 SSA 0.48 0.32 0.28 1.00 12.75 12.75 14.00 14.00
MWI 1987 SSA 0.29 0.08 1.00 1.00 3.01 3.01 3.65 3.65
MYS 2011 EAP 0.95 0.35 0.30 0.57 5.96 23.13 6.67 25.18
MDV 2006 SA 1.00 0.24 1.00 0.58 5.14 22.17 6.19 24.37
MLI 2006 SSA 0.51 0.45 0.76 0.88 4.84 9.79 5.49 10.87
MLT 2011 EU 1.00 0.34 0.00 0.54 5.94 24.28 6.51 26.33
MUS 2011 SSA 0.99 0.29 0.27 0.56 6.05 23.44 6.76 25.50
MDA 2011 EU 0.77 0.50 0.25 1.00 6.37 6.37 7.05 7.05
MNG 2011 EAP 0.84 0.49 0.33 0.95 5.55 7.61 6.19 8.42
MAR 2008 MENA 0.75 0.24 0.29 0.42 10.08 30.80 11.16 33.33
MOZ 2003 SSA 0.35 0.18 0.49 1.00 13.84 13.84 15.27 15.27
NAM 2011 SSA 0.92 0.63 1.00 0.82 2.20 9.91 2.63 11.01
NPL 2001 SA 0.44 0.97 1.00 0.77 0.12 10.81 0.14 11.82
NER 2005 SSA 0.20 0.50 1.00 0.38 1.11 28.87 1.33 31.26
OMN 2010 MENA 1.00 0.59 1.71 0.20 1.99 37.37 2.61 40.27
PAK 2008 SA 0.66 0.02 0.28 0.34 15.49 35.68 17.07 38.48
PAN 2011 LAC 0.78 0.60 0.03 0.67 5.76 18.90 6.32 20.57
PRY 2010 LAC 0.77 0.45 1.00 0.61 3.07 19.58 3.68 21.47
PER 2011 LAC 0.72 0.39 0.90 0.80 4.03 12.20 4.73 13.56
PHL 2008 EAP 0.74 0.46 0.66 0.66 4.86 18.91 5.52 20.70
QAT 2004 MENA 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.17 8.50 39.77 9.30 42.72
ROM 2011 EU 0.87 0.43 0.11 0.87 6.64 11.53 7.32 12.63
RUS 2008 EU 1.00 0.61 0.55 0.96 2.84 4.39 3.25 4.94
RWA 1996 SSA 0.45 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.72 0.85 0.85
LCA 2000 LAC 0.77 0.42 0.51 0.87 6.03 11.24 6.77 12.43
STP 1991 SSA 0.85 0.24 0.97 0.50 4.86 25.46 5.83 27.81
SAU 1992 MENA 1.00 0.10 0.11 0.13 8.49 41.66 9.37 44.69
SEN 2011 SSA 0.76 0.20 1.00 0.75 4.62 14.83 5.58 16.53
SRB 2011 EU 0.87 0.52 0.00 0.77 5.85 14.85 6.41 16.20
SGP 2011 EAP 1.00 0.47 0.08 0.79 4.51 13.28 4.97 14.52
ZAF 2011 SSA 1.00 0.37 0.86 0.77 4.33 13.71 5.11 15.23
LKA 2011 SA 0.71 0.23 0.45 0.57 9.34 24.98 10.43 27.19
KNA 2001 LAC 1.00 0.36 0.30 0.87 5.27 10.33 5.91 11.40
VCT 2008 LAC 1.00 0.46 0.57 0.76 4.01 14.21 4.60 15.65
SUR 1998 LAC 0.95 0.25 0.24 0.49 7.33 26.91 8.16 29.20
34
Country Year Region θ µ µo λ 1 2 3 4
SWZ 1997 SSA 0.98 0.79 1.00 0.69 1.26 14.95 1.50 16.39
SYR 2011 MENA 0.73 0.21 0.03 0.18 13.13 40.49 14.35 43.47
TJK 2009 CA 0.52 0.18 0.69 0.87 8.68 13.55 9.80 15.04
TZA 2011 SSA 0.56 0.33 0.93 1.00 3.99 3.99 4.68 4.68
THA 2011 EAP 0.70 0.38 0.46 0.94 7.39 9.59 8.25 10.64
TTO 2005 LAC 0.96 0.50 0.24 0.68 4.40 17.61 4.90 19.22
TUN 1994 MENA 0.88 0.27 0.37 0.32 7.45 33.93 8.34 36.63
UGA 2003 SSA 0.33 0.49 0.53 1.00 7.92 7.92 8.76 8.76
UKR 2011 EU 0.96 0.62 0.96 0.95 2.41 4.70 2.86 5.36
URY 2010 LAC 0.89 0.47 0.58 0.88 4.45 9.52 5.06 10.57
VEN 2011 LAC 0.76 0.34 0.86 0.65 4.66 18.95 5.44 20.82
VNM 2004 EAP 0.52 0.43 0.30 1.00 9.90 9.90 10.90 10.90
YEM 2010 MENA 0.78 0.43 1.00 0.08 3.20 43.37 3.83 46.48
ZMB 2000 SSA 0.55 0.33 0.36 1.00 10.54 10.64 11.64 11.75
ZWE 2002 SSA 0.67 0.56 1.00 0.92 2.22 5.72 2.66 6.46
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